Mobiflage:

Deniable Storage Encryption for Mobile Devices

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Why do we need plausible deniable encryption (PDE)?



PDE can protect a user when apprehended with controversial data

E.g., Syrian refugee smuggles evidence of atrocities under skin http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/1145824

- A user can feign compliance when coerced to reveal decryption keys/passwords
- Tools such as TrueCrypt provide PDE for desktop/laptop PCs
- PDE is arguably more important for mobile devices
- We explore inherent challenges by implementing PDE for Android



Two encrypted storage areas on physical medium

• Encrypted disk appears as uniformly random bytes

RANDOM BYTES

Encrypted volumes at different offsets with different keys Each volume is formatted to consume all remaining space

Encrypted Encrypted Volume Volume (Key 1) (Key 2)	
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Oecrypted outer volume appears to consume the entire disk Hidden volumes look like random bytes in decrypted free space

Decrypted Volume RANDOM BYTES (Key 1)	
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Contributions



- First mobile implementation
 Parts of Mobiflage design and implementation are Android specific
- Despite simple theoretical design, the implementation has non-trivial complications (e.g., boot process, Flash storage, filesystems, etc.)
- Explore sources of leakage/compromise inherent to mobile devices

Several have not been analyzed for existing desktop PDE solutions

 Sheds light on considerations beyond design requirements (e.g., FS and storage design, application permissions, communication channels)

Background on mobile storage encryption



- File based encryption
 - Selected individual files are encrypted with unique keys
 - Keys are wiped from RAM when device is "screen locked"
 - BlackBerry and Apple iOS (iOS behaviour is file-based, actual implementation closer to FDE)
- System/Full Disk Encryption (FDE)
 - Block ciphers act on individual disk sectors
 - Pre-boot authenticator to unlock/mount disk
 - On-the-fly (transparent to users/apps)
 - Key stays in RAM while "screen locked" (for background IO)
 - Google Android and Microsoft Windows Phone



User boots into a given mode based on the supplied password

- Standard Mode
 - Encryption without deniability
 - For day-to-day use of mobile device
 - Mounts "outer" volumes
- PDE Mode
 - Encryption with deniability
 - Used to store data and later deny existence
 - Mounts "hidden" volumes

Apps and data in each mode are independent Essentially two isolated installations are present


Storage considerations



- Android has two storage locations for user data
 - /data app packages and settings
 - /sdcard file data (photos, music, maps)
- Obiflage creates hidden volumes for both mount-points, to facilitate hidden apps and hidden data
- Hidden volumes consume 25% 50% of SD card storage (actual size derived from hidden password)
- Some devices have shared internal/external storage (i.e., no real/emulated SD card)


OS and kernel partitions are Read-Only and shared between Mobiflage modes

Mobiflage initialization




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Mobiflage usage – standard mode



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Mobiflage usage – PDE mode





Mobiflage makes 3 changes to default Android FDE:

- XTS-AES-256 cipher instead of CBC-AES-128 Prevents known weaknesses in CBC for FDE¹
- Wipe external storage with random bytes Necessary to conceal hidden volumes
- Enable encryption of removable storage Hidden volumes are stored on SD card

PDE is optional – users can still use default FDE Changes are still applied to ensure PDE/FDE are indiscernible


¹C. Fruhwirth. New methods in hard disk encryption. Technical report (July 2005). http://clemens.endorphin.org/nmihde/nmihde-A4-ds.pdf

Android default FS is Ext4



- Volume divided into *block groups* and data blocks
- 2 Each group has meta-data structures (inode table, block bitmap, backup superblock, etc.)
- **3** Ext4 spreads directories (and hence files) across block groups
- B Hidden volumes can overwrite meta-data structures and file data


Ext4 FS





Mobiflage uses FAT32 formatted external storage to hide volumes

- All meta-data at beginning of volume
- Remaining space is continuous data blocks



Sources of compromise addressed by Mobiflage



Flash storage

- Data remanence
- 2 Leakage from software
 - Filesystem collisions
 - Logs, swap-space, temp files, (e.g., /cache, /devlog)

Orypto-primitives

- FDE attacks watermarking, *copy-and-paste*, etc.
- Statistical deviations between RNG and cipher output

Remaining sources of compromise




- 4 Leakage from hardware
 - Flash wear-leveling (partial snapshots)
 - Device identifiers (e.g., MAC, IMEI)
 - Hardware component on-board cache (e.g., camera)
- Password guessing
 - Only 2000 PBKDF2 (PKCS#5) iterations
 - Outer/hidden share salt value
- Storage snapshots (e.g., border crossing)
- Other threats exist (malware, baseband attacks, etc.)

Collusion with carriers

Discrepancies between device logs and carrier/web service logs

Some defenses include:

- Disable cell antenna
- 2 Spoof identifiers (IMEI, MAC)
- Use anonymous SIM
- Use public WiFi or Tor/VPN
- Use pseudonymous accounts
- This is **not** a comprehensive list!





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Mobiflage performance



- Initialization time two-pass wipe of external storage
- Ø Boot time three invocations of PBKDF2 (negligible)
- Over consumption affects all FDE implementations
- IO performance DMA enabled hardware

Cipher-spec	Key-length	Speed	(KB/s)	Speed re	duction		
	(bits)	Nexus S	Xoom	Nexus S	Xoom		
Unencrypted	N/A	5880±260	4767±238	-	-		
AES-CBC-ESSIV	128	5559±76	4168±186	5.46%	12.57%		
(Android 4.x)							
AES-XTS-Plain64	512	$5288{\pm}69$	3929±146	10.07%	17.58%		
(Mobiflage)	(256+256)						

Observed read/write performance of external storage

(\approx 5% reduction over Android FDE)



- **1** Currently requires removable SD card or internal FAT32 partition
- Ø User cannot choose size of hidden volumes
- **③** No clean solution to transfer data between modes
- **O** Denial-of-service: adversary can wipe/confiscate device
- Only 50% of SD card can be used safely
- **o** Requires wide deployment so capability alone is not a red flag

Summary


- Mobiflage hides encrypted volumes in external storage Concordia incurring a tolerable impact on performance
- Provide the set of the set of
- **③** Different hardware profiles present non-trivial complications
- Unique challenges in mobile environment may lead to new design considerations

(e.g., storage, filesystems, permission systems)

Mobiflage project website:

http://users.encs.concordia.ca/~a_skil/mobiflage

Questions?



Source: XKCD



Mobiflage offset is derived from deniable password:

$$\textit{offset} = \lfloor 0.75 imes \textit{vlen}
floor - \left(\mathrm{H}(\textit{pwd} || \textit{salt}) \mod \lfloor 0.25 imes \textit{vlen}
floor
ight)$$

- Calculations are 512-Byte sector aligned
- Avoids new fields in Android footer
- Complicates large-scale dictionary attack campaign as compared to using a fixed offset (e.g., [0.5 × vlen]) (must capture at least 25% of each disk to mount attack)

Mobiflage

Android FDE footer



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30	76	ЗA	73	68	61	32	35	36	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	v	:	s	h	a	2	5	6								
40	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00																
50	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00																
60	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	76	FC	43	82	2C	1D	OF	6D								•	v i	ü (з,	,		¥	m	Key (16 Bytes)
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Extra 2



Typical volumes found on common Android devices:

Volume	Mount point	Mode	Description						
Boot	N/A	N/A	Bootloader and kernel image						
Recovery	N/A	N/A	Recovery tools and backup kernel						
System	/system	RO	OS binaries, Dalvik VM, etc.						
Cache	/cache	RW	Temporary space for OS and apps						
Cache	/ cacile		(e.g., OTA updates and downloaded .apk)						
Device log	/devlog	RW	Persistent system logs						
Userdata	/data	RW	Apps and settings						
External	/mnt/sdcard or	RW	App and user data						
External	/storage/sdcard0		(e.g., photos, maps, music)						